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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMHUTY LAW BY THE
COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND
STEEL COAMUNITY
GERHARD BEBR*

To establish and maintain a common, competitive coal and steel
market, the European Community for Coal and Steel' has extensive powers. Some of them are supranational in the sense that they
are directly applicable to the enterprises of heavy industry and
exercised independently of the Member States. 2 The most important powers are, by and large, distributed between the High Authority, the powerful administrator of the Community market,3 and the
Council of Ministers. While the High Authority is one of the truly
original concepts of the Community, the Council of Ministers resembles more the traditional body representing governments.4 The
judicial function in the widest sense is performed by a special
Court of the Community. Not only Member States and organs of
of the Community but even coal and steel enterprises and their
associations and in specific instances even third persons0 may have
access to the Court.
*Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.

The author is indebted to M. Roger M. Chevallier, Licencii en Droit,

Universit6 de Lille 1952, Dipl~m& d'Etudes Superieures de Droit public &

d'Histoire du Droit, Lille 1953, Laurdat de la Factflt de Droit de Lille, 1951,
for most able and valuable research assistance.
1. For the official English translation of the Treaty, see High Authority
of the European Coal and Steel Community, Treaty Establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter cited as Treaty) together with Annexes, Protocol on the Code of the Court of Justice, Convention Containing
the Transitional Provisions (hereinafter cited as Annexes, Code, and Convention respectively). Reglement de la Cour (hereinafter cited as Rules) may
be found in 2 Journal Officiel de la Communaut6 Europ6eune du Charbon et
de l'Acier (hereinafter cited as Journal Officiel) 37 (1953).
The judgments of the Court together with the conclusions of the Court
advocate may be found in Cour de Justice de la Communaute Europenne du
Charbon et de l'Acier, Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice
(hereinafter cited as Recueil).
For the official English translation of the treaties establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom see Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty) and Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Eenergy Community (Euratom) (hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty) (1957).
2. For a survey of these powers see Bebr, The European Coal and Steel
Communitv,: A Politicaland Legal Innovation, 63 Yale L.J. 1, 20-1 (1953).
3. Treaty, Art. 8.
4. Id. Art. 27.
5. Id. Articles 33; 35; 36; 37; 38.
For a detailed discussion of this problem see Bebr, Protection of Private
Interests Under the European Coal and Steel Con ntunity, 42 Va. L. Rev. 879
especially at 883-910 (1956).
6. Thus, for example, Treaty Articles 40, para. 1-2; 63(2b) ; 66(5),
para. 2.
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Even this very brief sketch may sufficiently indicate that the
Community is an organization sui generis. Any attempt to subsume
it under the headings of traditional international organizations is
misleading and does violence to the actual nature of the Community.7 The Community is a creation of practical consideration,
purposely shying away from the frozen and petrified concepts of
the past.8 It is a creation of common interest and solidarity" of an
intensity unknown to traditional international organizations. It is
this solidarity which shaped the nature of the Community and its
institutional structure.
The Treaty establishing the Community is its constitution. It
binds Member States and enterprises alike. Accordingly the enterprises have a double allegiance, being subject to the law of the
Community and to municipal laws of their States as well. 10 Thus
the Treaty is supraordinated to and coordinated with the municipal
laws.:" It is a peculiar and complex legal symbiosis of the Community law within and above the legal systems of the Member
States, marked in specific instances by a penetration into a sphere
traditionally reserved to municipal law. The effects of this penetration were so far-reaching that constitutional amendments in some
Member States were required."2
7. For a sharp and excellent refutation of such futile attempts, see particularly De VisscherLe Droit Public de la Communaut6 Europenne du
Charbon et de l'Acier 3, 12-3, 59, 85 (1956).
Part of the author's observation deserves to be cited in full: "Assimiler
l'ordre juridique de ]a Ceca
l'ordre juridique d'un Etat f~d~ral est une
grossiere erreur... Si l'on ne peut pas assimiler l'ordre juridique de la Ceca A
l'ordre juridique d'un Etat F~dral, on ne peut pas blus l'assimiler totalement
i l'ordre juridique d'une organisation internationale, tout au moins Ll'ordre
juridique d'une organisation internationale classique." Id. 12-13.
See also the interesting observation of Schlochauer, Zur Frageder Rechtsnatur der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fuir Kohle und Stahl in Rechtsfragen
der Internationalen Organisation-Festschrift f/ir Hans Wehberg (Scha.tzel
& Schlochauer eds.) 361, 371 (1956): ". . . Obwohl das nach der ersten
Handlungsphase iiberreichte Memorandum der franz6sischen Delegation
vom 10. August 1950 noch von einer 'lien f6d6ral' sprach, haben die Delegationen davon abgesehen, 'das Zusammenspiel der Organe konsequent nach der
bekannten Form bundesstaatlichen Verfassungsrecht zu konstruieren'...,"
citing Mosler.
8. Delvaux, La notion de supranationalitidans le Traiti du 18 avril
1951, criant la Ceca 4, 11 (1957, manuscript).
9. Munch, Internationale Organisationenmit Hoheitsrechten in Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisationen: Festschrift fi/r Hans Wehberg
(Schitzel & Schlochauer eds.) 301, 303 (1956).
10. Lagrange, La protection juridique des entreprises dans la Communata et dans les Etats Membres 17 (Centre Italien d'Etudes Juridiques,
Congr~s International d'Etudes sur ]a Communaut6 Europ6enne du Charbon
et de l'Acier, Recueil de Communications No. 18, 1957).
11. De Visscher, op. cit. supra.note 7, at 84.
12. Wigny, Congr~s International d'Etudes sur la Communaut6 Europ~enne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Compte Rendu Analytique, First Session,
June 6, 1957 at 6.
For the Netherlands Constitutional amendment see: Staatsblad Van Het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, No. 295 at 491, 495 (1953). English translation
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The Treaty merely spells out the principles which should govern
the administration of the common market, the exercise of the powers
of the Community organs, and the extent of judicial protection. It
does not indicate the source of law or the principles according to
which the Community law might be developed by the Court. The
legal nature of various relations and situations regulated by the
Treaty are so different that other laws governed by different legal
principles may have to be developed. As an executive of the Community, the High Authority interprets and applies the Treaty in
its daily operation, thus developing an administrative law of the
Community. Ultimately, however, it is the Court of the Community
which by its creative interpretation from case to case formulates its
law in all the various branches. Although the Court enjoys a
"judicial monopoly,"' 3 its jurisdiction, though manifold, is an ex14
ception to the rule. Unless otherwise provided for by the Treaty,
the municipal courts of the Member States retain their jurisdiction
and may interpret certain Treaty provisions.' 5 The Treaty may
then be interpreted and applied according to different rules of
interpretation. These will depend on the nature of legal relations
and the interests at stake as well as on the sources of law which
regulate them, and on the courts called upon to render the judgment.
may be found in Inter-Parliamentary Union, Constitutional and Parliamentary
Information 104 (3d Series, No. 13, Jan. 1953) and 26 (3d Series, No. 29,

Jan. 1957).

For further discussion see particularly Bauer, Die niederliindische Verfassungsdinderung von 1956 betreffend die auswarige Gewalt, 18 Zeitschrift
fur Auslfindisches Offentliches Recht und V5lkerrecht 137 (Germany 1957) ;
van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and InternationalLaw, 47 Am.
J. Int'l L. 537 (1953); Zimmermann, Die Neuregelung der auswiirtigen
Gewalt in der Verfassung der Niederlande, 15 Zeitschrift ffir
Auslndisches
Offentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht 164 (1955).

For the Luxembourg Constitutional Amendment see 30 Pasinomie

Luxembourgeoise, Recueil des Lois, Decrets 336 (1957); for an English
translation of this amendment see Inter-Parliamentary Union, Constitutional
and Parliamentary Information 49 (3d Series, No. 30, April, 1957).
For Belgium see Declaration de R i sion de la Constitution [1954]
Pasinomie 195. For a recent discussion of the Belgian constitutional problem
see Goossens, La Communauti Europienne di Charbon et de lAcier et le
R gine constitutioniel de la Belgique, 71 Revue du Droit Public et de ]a
Science Politique 98 (1955).
13. See Treaty, Art. 44 according to which the judgments of the Court
are directly enforceable in the territory of the Member States. The State's
judiciary must enforce the judgment upon its mere verification of authenticity.
14. Thus, for example, Treaty, Articles 33; 35; 36; 39; 40, para. 1-2;
41 ; 63(2b) ; 65(4) ; 66(5).
15.
fatthies, Das Recht der Europiiischen Geneinschaft fir Kohle und
Stahl und die nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten, 9 Juristenzeitung 305
(1954).
See also the judgment of Landesgericht Saarbricken (Kammer fiir
HandelssachenI) of July 27, 1955 (No. 7-0 268/54) at 7 as published by the
High Authority Doc. No. 6354/55 d.
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After a brief exposition of the unique nature of the Court and its
jurisdiction, this article examines, first, the technique of the Court
in applying the various sources of law upon which the Treaty indirectly rests. It turns then to the Court's method of interpreting
the Treaty as well as municipal laws specifically and directly referred to by the Treaty.
I. THE

COMPOSITION AND NATURE OF THE COURT

The Court is composed of seven judges unanimously elected
by the governments of the Member States'-a stricter requirement
that that prescribed for the election of judges on the International
Court of justice.' 7 This may be explained by the greater and far
more differentiated powers which the Court of the Community
wields. Following the continental practice, the Court renders judgment as a collegiate body.' Separate or dissenting opinions are
thus unknown. 9 At an early stage in the development of the Community law this seems wise for it avoids judgments whose validity
may be seriously weakened by separate or dissenting opinions of
individual judges. A certainty of judgment may at this stage count
more than its fragile soundness arrived at and impaired by individual opinions. Neither may the Court render advisory opinions
as the International Court of Justice does.2 0 This shortcoming
16. Treaty, Art. 32, which makes no provision as to the nationality of
eligible judges. However that only nationals of the Member States are eligible
may be indirectly inferred from the provision of the Code, Art. 3, para. 3
which declares that "only the courts with jurisdiction over the highest members
of the national judiciary in each member State shall have the jurisdiction in
criminal proceedings against judges whose immunity has been so suspended."
(Emphasis added.)
The Court is now also common to the newly established European Economic Community and to Euratom. The composition of the Court is governed,
without substantial change, by the Euratom Treaty Convention Relating to
Certain Institutions Common to European Communities, Sec. II, Art. 4;
and by the EEC Treaty, Convention Relating to Certain Institutions

Sec. II, Art. 4.
See also Euratom Treaty, Art. 139; EEC Treaty, Art. 167.
Unlike the Statute of International Court of Justice, Art. 31, the Code
Art. 19, para. 4, excludes the possibility of an ad-hoc judge. Accordingly the
party may not invoke the nationality of a judge or his absence on the bench
"in order to ask for change in the composition of the Court. .. .' See also
Euratom Treaty, Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 16. The
Protocol to the EEC Treaty has an identical provision in Art. 16.
17. I.C.J. Statute, Articles 4(1) ; 8; 10.
18. Implicitly Code, -Articles 29, 30; Rules, Art. 54.
De Richemont, Communaut6 Europenne du Charbon et de l'Acier: la
Cour de Justice 249 (1954).
19. See however I.C.J. Statute, Art. 57.
20. The French proposal of Nov. 9, 1950 in Article 26, para. 3 provided
for an advisory opinion of the Court:
La Haute Autorit6, en accord avec le Conseil, peut demander A la Cour
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should not be critized too harshly. In its wide and multiple jurisdiction the role of an advisory opinion would have been rather
limited and secondary.
In its work the Court is assisted by two Court advocates. 2 ' Their
function is patterned after the French Commissaire du Gouvernement at the Conseil d'Etat.2 2 The expression "Court advocate" may
easily mislead and cause misunderstanding. It must be strongly
emphasized that he is neither a judge nor a public prosecutor.
Neither does he participate in the deliberation of the Court nor
vote with the Court. His only but vital function is to prepare an
2
opinion for the advise of the Court on any question submitted to it. 3
Although not part of the judgment itself, and therefore not legally
binding, his opinions may strongly influence the development of
the law of the Community.2 4 At least this has been the experience
with the French Commissaire du Gouvernement whose opinions,
in some instances, shaped the development of French administrative
law more profoundly than the judgments of the Conseil d'Etat 2
itself. This may not be surprising for the Commissaire speaks his
mind more freely than the Conseil being aware that his opinion
is not legally binding. The Court advocate might very well follow
this tradition.
des avis consultatifs sur l'Interpr&ation des clauses du present Trait6
ou des protocoles annexes.
as reproduced by Steindorff, Die Nichtigkeitsklage im Recht der Europiischen
Gemeinscbaft ffir Kohle und Stahl 166 (1952).
See, however, I.C.J. Statute, Art. 65.

21. Treaty, Art. 32 as revised by Euratom & EEC Treaties, Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to European Communities,

Art. 4.
Also Code, Art. 11.
22. Hamson, Executive Discretion and Judicial Control 79-81 (1954).
See also Guillien, Les commissaires du gouvernement pris les juridictions
administratives et, sp cialement, pros le Conscil d'Etat franCais. 71 Revue du

Droit Public et de la Science Politique 281 (France 1955) ; Sauvel, Les
originesdes commissaires du gouvernement 9 upr.s du Conseil d'Etat statuant
at contentieux, 65 Revue du Droit Public et de la Science politique 5 (1949).
23. Code, Art 11, provides:
[T]be function of the Court advocates shall be to present publicly and
with complete impartiality and independence oral reasoned arguments on
the cases submitted to the Court, in order to assist the Court in the performance of its duties, as defined in Article 31 cf the Treaty.
The Court advocate is obliged to prepare a conclusion not only on pending judgments of the Court but also on its Rulings; see, for example, the conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer on the Intervention of the Luxembourg
Government in Cases Nos. 7/54 and 9/54, 2 Recueil 149 (1954-5) or on the
suspension of execution of an act of the High Authority in Case No. 18/57
R, Dec. 3, 1957 (Case Nold).
24. For this reason it is regrettable that most commentators completely
disregard the conclusions of the Court advocate which preceed the judgments
of the Court.
25. Gazier, Apercu sur l'oeuvre juridictionnelle des commissaires du
gouverncment depuis 1900 in Le Conseil d'Etat, Livre Jubilaire 303 (1952).
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In an international society which is being integrated, the nature
of the Court and its jurisdiction assumes a new role and develops
new features.2 6 Even a cursory glance at the Treaty reveals an
unusually rich and varied jurisdiction of the Court which eludes
any traditional classification.2 7 Thus, for example, the Court is an
administrative, 28

civil, 29 constitutional"

and even international

court ;"1 in few instances it operates as a disciplinary tribunal,3 2 and
in one or two instances it even functions as an arbitrator. 33 These
multiple jurisdictions make it abudantly clear that the Court of the
Community should not be compared with the International Court
of Justice 34-- except perhaps when the Court deals with disputes
between Member States concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty. 5 The administrative jurisdiction of the Court
overshadows its international jurisdiction so much that there is
hardly any ground for comparing it with the International Court
of Justice. If in this exposition nevertheless such a reference is made,
it is only to demonstrate more forcefully the wide abyss which
divides these two courts.
II. TiE LAw OF THE COMMUNITY: ITS SOURcE
AND INTERPRETATION

A. Source of Convmunity Law
Neither the High Authority nor the Court operate within a
well developed legal system. The primary source of the Community
law is, of course, the Treaty. But its provisions are general and
most of its concepts are left undefined. To regulate economic affairs
26. Reuter, Le droit au secret et les institutions internationales, 2

Annuaire Frangais de Droit International 46, 65 (1956).

27. L'Institut des Relations Internationales de Bruxelles, la Communaut6 Europgenne du Charbon et de l'Acier 222 (1953).
In view of the rich and multiple jurisdiction of the Court it is rather
baffling that originally only an arbitration tribunal was proposed; see
Minist~re d'Etat, Service Information et Presse, le Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg et la Communaut6 Europgenne du Charbon et l'Acier 26 (1952) ; or
Bonnefous, L'Europe en face de son destin 170 (1952).
28. Treaty, Articles 33, 35, 36, 38.
29. Id. Articles 40, 66(5).
30. Id. Article 95, para. 4.
31. Id. Arts. 10, para. 11, 88, 89.
32. Id. Art. 12, para. 2; Code, Art. 3, para. 2.
33. Treaty, Art. 37, paras. 3-4.
34. Conclusions of Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 8/55, 2
Recueil 231, 263 (1955-6).
35. However even in this instance the Treaty goes further than the
Statute of the International Court of Justice for it prescribes a compulsory
jurisdiction. Art. 89: "Any dispute among member States concerning the
application of this Treaty... may be submitted to the Court at the request
of one of the States which are parties to the dispute."
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whose dynamic nature precludes the formation of rigid and detailed
provisions, the Treaty provisions must, to some extent, be coached
in general terms and retain certain flexibility, should they be
applicable in practice at all. For this reason the Treaty is supplemented by acts of the High Authority issued in response to actual
situations. In a few instances the Authority is explicitly obliged to
issue general acts ;:" in the majority of cases though it has discretion
to do so.37
Unlike the Statute of the International Court of Justice,3" the
Treaty is practically silent as to the sources of law and their hierarchy which could or should guide the Court in developing the
law of the Community. 9 This silence is quite understandable. The
Community is such an unprecedented legal experiment that at the
time of drafting the Treaty, it was almost impossible to envisage in
detail the variety of legal relations and the proper source of law governing them. The relation of enterprises and their associations to the
High Authority predominates by far.40 Second stand the relation
among the various organs of the Community and their relation with
the Member States.-1 Finally, the relation among the Member States
themselves with regard to the Community Treaty must be mentioned.4 - The enterprise-Community relation is such that international law is hopelessly ill-equipped to regulate it. 43 In most instances this relation resembles rather the relation of the individual
to a public authority of a municipal law. In a sense the Treaty which
governs this relation contains strong elements of a public administrative law. The power to fix prices,' 4 enforce anti-cartel provisions, 4 approve certain agreements among enterprises 6 and above
all to impose sanctions upon violating enterprisese7---to cite at
36. Thus, for example, Treaty, Art. 66(1).

37. Id.Art. 60(1).
38. I.C.J. Statute, Art. 38.
39. Delvaux, la Cour de Justice de la Cornmunaut6 Europ6enne du
Charbon et de 1'Acier 93, 97-8 (1956).
40. Treaty, Arts. 47; 48; 50; 51(2) ; 54; 58(2); 59(4, 7); 60; 61;

62; 63(2) ; 64; 65; 66; 80; 83; 91.
41. Id. Arts. 58(1); 59(1,3); 61; 63(1,3); 67; 69; 71; 75; 76; 86;
88; 90.
42. Id. Arts. 70(3); 71; 79; 87; 89.

43. For a sharp refutation of the application of international law see the
conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer in Affaire No. 6 (Gouvernement
du Royaume des Pays-Bas c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 229, 232 (1954-5).
See further De Visscher, la Communaut6 Eurc.penne du Charbon et de
l'Acier et les Etats Membres 38 (Centre Italien d'Etudes Juridiques, Congr~s
International d'Etudes sur la Communaut6 Europ~enne du Charbon et de

I'Acie, 1957).
!4.

Treaty, Arts. 60, 61.

45. Id. Arts. 65(4, 5), 66(5, 6).
46. Id. Arts. 53, 65(2), 66(2).
47. Id. Art 64.
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random only few examples-indicate sufficiently that the Community is a public organization which operates within a public
48
order of its own.
To regulate various legal relations, there is not and cannot
be one single source of law the Court could utilize. Only an analysis
of the Treaty provisions from case to case and a patient examination
of the nature of the relations and situations may provide an answer.
Such an analysis reveals references to various brances of law and its
sources. Leaving aside the Treaty itself and its specific provisions,
the general acts of the Authority as well as the slowly developing
Jurisprudence of the Court, references to municipal law of the Member States are most frequent. 49 These references are either to
municipal laws in general"0 or they are specifically made to a municipal law of a particular Member State.-'
The general reference to municipal law is the richest source out
of which the Court will primarily weave a true Community law. 2
Such a development of law by analogy is of course not unique as is
well illustrated by the reception and modification of institutions of
municipal law by international law5" or by the law of international
48. See, for example, the conclusions of the Court Advocate Lagrange
in Affaire No. 1-54 (Gouvernement de la R~publique Frangaise c. Haute
Autorit6) 1 Recueil 35, 60 (1954-5).
49. L'Institut des Relations Internationales de Bruxelles, la Communaut6 Europfenne du Charbon et de l'Acier 232 (1953) ; see also Delvaux,
op. cit. supra note 39, at 95.
50. Treaty, Arts. 6, para. 4; 9, para. 7; 12, para. 2; 31; 33; 34, para. 1;
35, para. 2; 40; 42; 46, paras. 1, 2; 47, paras. 2,3, 4; 49, paras. 3, 4; 60(1,2);
63(1,2); 64; 65(5); 66(1,5,6,7) ;
Protocol, Arts. 1; 4(a) ; 9, para. 4;
Code, Arts. 4; 9; 16, para. 2; 20, para. 2; 34, para. 1; 37.
Rules, Arts. 10, para.2; 27, para. 5; 33, para. 2; 53, para. 1; 71, para. 2;
73, para. 1.
51. Treaty ,Arts. 4(c) ; 6, para. 3; 9, paras. 3, 4; 21, para. 1; 26, para. 1;
43, para. 2; 48, para. 1 ; 51(1), para. 2; 52, paras. 1, 2; 53, para. 2; 54, para. 5;
59(3) ; 66(5), para. 6; 67(1,2,3); 68, (1,2,3) ; 68(5), para. 2; 69, (1,4);
70, paras. 2, 3, 4, 5; 71, para. 1; 72; 73; 74(3); 75, paras. 1, 2; 86; 90; 96.
Protocol, Arts. 5, para. 1; 7(a, b) ; 9(a, b).
Code, Arts. 3, para. 3 ; 20, paras. 1, 2, 4, 5 ; 28, paras. 4, 5.
Rules, Arts. 2, para. 2; 26, para. 3; 27, paras. 2, 4; 41, paras. 2, 4.
52. This was clearly stated by the Court advocate Lagrange in his
conclusions in Affaire No. 3-54 (Assider c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 143,
148: "... .ilne s'agit pas ici d'appliquers le droit italien ni le droit francais ni
celui de tout autre pays de la Communaut6, mais le droit du Trait6, et c'est
uniquement pour parvenir 5. l'6laboration de ce droit du Trait6 que l'6tude
des solutions juridiques nationales doit 6tre entreprise, chaque fois qu'elle
apparait n6cessaire & cette fin."
See also his conclusions in Affaire No. 8-55 (Fdration Charbonni&re
de Belgique c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 230, 263 (1955-6).
53. Guggenheim, Landescrechtliche Begriffe im V5lkerrecht, vor allns
im Bereich der internatonalen,Organisation in Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation: Festschrift ffir Hans Wehberg (Schitzel & Schlochauer eds.) 133, 134, 138, 149-50 (1956).
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organizations.' 4 Aside from this common ground, the purpose of
these references is however wide apart. The Treaty refers to
municipal laws as potential means for developing a comprehensive
legal system of the Community supported by some degree of
solidarity. The lack of such a solidarity in the wider international
society prevents present international law from such a development.
The general Treaty reference to municipal laws are mere signposts for the general direction along which the Court may develop
the Community law. In this creative process, the Court will undoubtedly encounter difficult and vexing problems. Thus it must
avoid a servile imitation of municipal laws and its jurisprudence. 55
The Court forms a synthesis out of municipal laws and brings them
in accord with the objectives and needs of the Community and its
political and economic climate. This process may differ depending
on whether or not the municipal laws generally referred to disclose
some fundamental identity or not. If they do, the Court may use
them as a starting point for creating the Community law. The Court's
creative function is even more extensive when the respective municipal laws are contradictory. As there is no common, underlying principle in this instance, the Court evaluates and weighs these differences, reconciles them, and modifies this result in accordance with
the purposes of the Community. Secondly, the-general reference to
municipal law will not spare the Court of the delicate decision as to
whether to apply in its creative process the private or public branch
of municipal law. This problem will also be faced when applying
sources of law directly referred to by the Treaty. On the other hand,
explicit or implicit references to international law as a possible
source of the Community law are few. Without undue exaggeration,
54. Id. 133, 142-3, 146-7.
Particularly the jurisprudence of the United Nations and I.L.O. Administratives Tribunals show an interesting reception of institutions of public
municipal laws, see Jessup, Transnational Law 84-5 (1956).
In several judgments these Administratives Tribunals utilized even the
concept of 'drtournement de pouvoir,' see Bedjaoui, jurispruence Conpar&e
des tribunaux adinstratfsinternationaux en iati~re d'excs de pouvoir, 2
Annuaire Franais de Droit International 482, 484-9 (1956).
Particularly noteworthy are the following judgments: United Nations
Administrative Tribunal: Judgement No. 2, Aubert v. Secretary-General,
judgement No. 20, Middleton v. Secretary-General.
I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal: judgment No. 17, Duberg v. UNESCO;
No. 18, Leff v. UNESCO; No. 19, Wilcox v. UNESCO; No. 22, Fromma v.

UNESCO.
55. See the clear warning sounded by Reuter, Le droit au secret et les
institutions internationales,2 Annuaire Frangais de Droit International 46,
59 (1956).
See also the conclusions of the Court Advocate Lagrange in Affaire
No. 8-55 (F~dration Charbonni re de Belgique c. Haute Autorit6) 2
Recueil 231, 253 (1955-6).
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it may be maintained that the role of international law in the Court's
creative process is rather secondary.5
B. Interpretationof Community Law

There are, and can be, no universally valid rules of interpretation
of international treaties whether bilateral or multilateral. The widely
split disagreement on the proper method of interpretation seems to
stem, at least partly, from the failure to recognize that the context
within which the treaty is being interpreted is a decisive factor
which predetermines the selection of specific rules of interpretation
and which also explains the preference given to one rule of interpretation over another one.57 A change in the context will most likely affect
the selection of a rule of interpretation as well. The rules appear
therefore artificial and seldom void of arbitrariness. They are only
of relative validity and their importance must not be exaggerated.5 s
Within their limited usefulness, they should be taken for what they
really are-fragile but pliable guides in the hands of an interpreter.
The steady growth of multilateral treaties whose objectives and
nature widely differ prompts the interpreter to apply rules of interpretation which would more realistically take into consideration
both the peculiarities and divergencies of such treaties and the
context within which they operate. 55 There is, therefore, a growing
recognition that such treaties require new rules of interpretation or
rather a new hierarchy of these rules. This is particularly true in
the case of treaties establishing international organizations.co The
application of these constitutive treaties encounters new situations
for whose solution the traditional canons of interpretation appear
unsuitable. Reference may be made, for example, to the creative
56. Conclusions of the Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 8-55
(F~dration Charbonni~re de Belgique) 2 Recueil 231, 263 (1955-6).
57. Thus, for example Stone, Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation--A Study in the International Judicial Process, 1 Sidney L. Rev. 344,
364-65 (1953-55) ; Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand the Principleof
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 48, 55
(1949).
58. Thus Lauterpacht observes that:
[I]n a sense the controversy as to the justification of rules of interpretation partakes of some degree of artificiality inasmuch as it tends to
exaggerate their importance. For as a rule they are not the determining
cause of judicial decisions, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means. It is elegant-and it inspires confidenceto give the garb of an established rule of interpretation to a conclusion
reached as to the meaning of a statute, of a contract, or of a treaty. But
it is a fallacy to assume that the existence of these rules is a secure safeguard against arbitrariness or partiality.... rd. 53.
59. De Visscher, op. cit. supra note 7, at 3-4; see also observation of
Bourquin in 44 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 396-7 (Part II,
1952).
60. See, for example, the comments of Alvarez and Rousseau id. at
366, 378 respectively.
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force of practices of various organs of international organizations, 6 '
or to the shallow concept of the intent of parties, the validity of
2
which is gradually replaced by the principle of effectiveness. Because of its unique conception, this consideration has even greater
validity for the Community Treaty. The different relations encompassed by the Treaty and governed in practice by a variety of
legal sources doom any attempt to apply and develop uniform rules
of interpretation. Only diversified rules of interpretation may do
justice to these multiple relations and to the nature of interests
involved. 3 It is, therefore, quite natural that the Treaty does not
indicate possible rules of interpretation leaving the Court free to
64
utilize its own rules.
The political and economic solidarity of which the Community
is an expression, will profoundly influence the development of rules
of interpretation and predetermine their selection.6 5 A natural
corollary to this solidarity is the teleological interpretation as the
primary, overriding canon of interpretation. According to this rule
"a treaty must be interpreted-and not only interpreted, but as it
were assisted or supplemented-by reference to its objects, principles, and purposes, as declared, known or to be presumed. In this
way, gaps can be filled, corrections made, texts expanded or supplemented, always so long as this is consistent with, or in furtherance
6
of, the objects, principles, and purposes in question."'6 Constitutions
of traditional international organizations are increasingly inter61. La Pradelle, id. 391; Lauterpacht, Decisions of Municipal Courts
as Source of International Law, 10 Brit. Y.B. Int1l L. 65, 89 (1929) ; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
Treaty Interpretationand Certahi Other Treaty Points, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.
1, 22 (1951).
62. Fitzmaurice, id. 1, 3-4; Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit Y.B.
Int'l L. 48, 52 (1949).
63. Reuter, les Interventions de la Haute Autorit6 58 (Centre Italien
d'Etudes, Congr~s International d'Etudes sur la Communaut6 Europ~enne
du Charbon et de l'Acier); also de Visscher, la Communaut6 Europ6enne
du Charbon et de l'Acier et les Etats Membres 60 (Centre Italien d'Etudes
juridiques, Congr&s International d'Etudes sur la Commtmaut6 ...1957).
See, however, the sweeping and dogmatic generalization of the Dutch
agent in Affaire No. 6-54, Procs verbal 10, 11.
64. Treaty, Art. 31, merely states:
The function of the Court is to ensure the rule of law in the interpretation
and application of the present Treaty and of the regulations for its
execution.
See the statement of M. Gaudet, Director of the Legal Division of the
High Authority in Affaire No. 1-54, Procs verbal 121: ". . . Parfaitement
consciente qu'elle (Haute Autorit6) peut, comme les Gouvernements et les
entreprises, errer dans l'interpr~tation du TraitiL dont la Cour seule fixe
souverainement le sens, la Haute Autorit& souhaite du moins 6tablir la
sinc6rit6 et la fidlit6 de ses intentions."
65. de Visscher, op. cit. supra note 7, at 6.
66. Fitzmaurice, supra note 61, at 8.
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preted in the light of their objectives.67 With even far greater justification may the Court avail itself of this dynamic and creative interpretation of the Treaty, for the operation of the Community will
reveal shortcomings of the Treaty and raise problems originally not
anticipated. To assure a smooth, undisturbed operation of the Community, the Court will have to resort to teleological interpretation.
However, teleological-or sometimes called effective or functionalinterpretation may be applied only within the area in which the
Community operates. Thus this principle appears necessarily limited
by the principle of restrictive interpretation which purports to keep
the power of the Community within the limits agreed dpon by the
Member States in the Treaty.68 This seems a reasonable assumption.
The delicate balance between the interests of the Community on
the one hand and that of the Member States on the other-a balance
which is also reflected in the mutual relation of these two principles
-is ultimately conditioned by political, economic and social realities.
The rule of teleological interpretation is therefore merely a relative
concept of interpretation.
On the other hand, the nature of the Treaty minimizes the application of other rules of interpretation. Thus, for example, the application of the intent of parties as one of the canons of interpretations
appears, because of its ambiguity, doubtful.6 9 The travaux pr paratoiresusually resorted to, as allegedly demonstrating the intent
of parties, are more often than not so contradictory that practically
any "intention" desired may be proved. As no preparatory protocols
were drafted on the Community Treaty, 70 the Court is fortunately
spared from being harassed by dubious arguments as to the intent
67. See, for example, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service
of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949, [1949] I.C.J.
Rep. 173, 178, 185 ; Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee
on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of June 1, 1956, [1956] I.C.J.
Rep. 23, 27-8.
For further comments Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the
Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 48, 68 (1949).
68. L'Institut des Relations Internationales de Bruxelles, op. cit. supra
note 27, at 200.
As to the relation of principle of effective interpretation with that of
restrictive interpretation see, La Pradelle in 44 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit
International 396 (Part II, 1952) and Rolin, id. 400. Also Lauterpacht, supra
note 57, at 67.
69. See, for example, Lauterpacht, id. 52; Scelle in 44 Annuaire de
l'Institut de Droit International 394, 398 (Part II, 1952) ; Harvard Research
Draft on Treaties 953 (1935).
70. Conclusions of Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire 8-55 (F6d6ration
Charbonni~re de Belgique c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 231, 252 (1955-6) ;
also Mosler, Der Vertrag iiber die Europiiische Gemeinschaft fiir Kohl und
Stahl, 14 Zeitschrift ffir Auslundisches Offentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht
1, 14 (Germany 1951-2). Similar observation was made by Rolin in 44
Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 392 (Part II, 1952).

COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY

of parties. There are additional reasons which militate against
applying the intent of drafters as a reliable guide of interpretation.
It is hard to believe that all drafters could have fully understood
the complex ramifications of the many notions incorporated in the
Treaty. In many instances the true intent of parties is a mere agreement in principle. Thus, for example, the nature and extent of professional secrecy of enterprises against the acts of the High Authority, 71 or the liability of the Community72 would have required an
extensive comparative study to become really meaningful-a requirement which obviously could not have been met during the
drafting conference.
In the absence of travaux pr~paratoiresof the conference, the
ghost of the intent of parties as a principle of interpretation may be
revived by resorting to governmental reports which accompanied
and explained the text of the Treaty submitted to the parliaments for
ratification. These reports-particularly the lengthy report of the
French delegation-are frequently cited. Although in principle their
importance is undeniable, 73 their precise assessment is difficult to
make. Even these reports are not altogether immune from the
criticism levelled against the application of the intent of parties as
a rule of interpretation .In the opinion of a distinguished authority
these governmental reports were basically harmonized and coordinated with each other.74 However, since these reports seem to place
different emphasis on specific Treaty provisions, a possible conflict
between them may not be entirely excluded.
In one of the earlier appeals the application of the principle of
intent of parties was set aside by one of the Court advocates who
himself had participated in drafting the Treaty. It was the clear
intent of the drafters to permit appeals of enterprises and their
associations against general acts of the High Authority only on
the ground of misapplication of power specifically committed by
disguising an individual act in the garb of a general act.7 Despite the
clear intent to grant enterprises and their associations only a very
limited appeal, an appeal which would have in practice offered very
little protection, the Court advocate did not hesitate to disregard it.
71. Treaty, Art. 47, paras. 2, 4.
72. Id. Arts. 34, 40.
73. Thus Rolin, 44 Annuaire de l'Iinstitut de Droit International 392
(Part II, 1952), observes with some caution: "Dans la mesure oti ces d~elara-

tions purement unilat~rales seront concordantes, il sera lgitime d'en tenir

compte dans le processus d'interpr~tation du traitL"
74. Conclusions of Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire 8-55 (F6dration

Charbonni~re de Belgique c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 231, 252 (1955-6).

75. Conclusions of Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 3-54

(Assider c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 143, 171-2 (1954-5).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:845

To extent.the protection he pleaded for a broader right of appeal."0
In his interpretation, later re-iterated7 7 any misapplication of power
implied in a general act which affected interests of enterprises and
their associations should be a ground for appeal-an interpretation
inspired by the principle of effectiveness. Following the opinion
of its Court advocate, even the Court disdainfully dismissed the
intent of parties. However, it preferred to justify its interpretation

78
cn the ground of the plain meaning of words used.
A new problem arises out of the relation of the European Coal
and Steel Community Treaty with the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom. These new Treaties
might easily tempt one to interpret their provisions with the purpose of "re-discovering" the intent of parties with regard to some
of the obscure provisions of the Coal and Steel Community Treaty.
Such a round-about way of interpretation, based itself on the
slippery ground of intent, is erroneous and not without hidden
pitfalls. Although the Court is common to all three European Com-

munities, 79 the extent and nature of its jurisdiction is not identical. s0
76. Id. 172-73.
77. Conclusions of Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 8-55
(Fidration Charbonni~re de Belgique c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 231, 253

(1955-6).

78. Judgement No. 3-54 (Assider c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 125, 138
(1954-5).
79. See note 16, supra.
80. Thus, for example, unlike under the Treaty, Arts. 33, para. 1; 36;
37; 66(5), para. 2, the Court has under the new Communities no explicit
right to review in specific instances the findings and evaluations of facts as
found by the respective Commissions, Euratom Treaty, Art. 146; EEC Treaty,
Art. 173. This may be explained by the much larger part the Council of Ministers plays in the operation of these Communities. Only the EEC Treaty,
Art. 172 makes a possible exception-if the Council of Ministers decides so.
The Article provides that "[T]he regulations laid down by the Council
pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty may confer on the Court of Justice
full jurisdiction in respect of penalties provided for in such a regulation."
(Emphasis added.)
Chambres des Deputes, Projets de loi Portant Approbation du Trait6
Instituant la Communaut6 lconomique Europ~enne . .. Expos6 des Motifs
(No. 636-8) 39 (Luxembourg 1957). The expose states: "La Cour de
Justice a requ un caract~re en un sens plus international que ne l'tait le
mission de Ia Cour de la C.E.C.A.... Au contraire, les nouveaux Trait~s
n'ont pas retenu les pouvoirs d'appr6ciation politique ou conomique qui sont
d~volus a la Cour dans le Trait6 C.E.C.A. ... A cet 6gard, la mission de la
Cour nouvelle sera plus strictement juridique que la mission de la Cour de la
C.E.C.A."
Erliuterungen zu den Vertrfgen zur Griindung der Europhischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europdischen Atomgemeinschaft Drucksache
#3440, Deutscher Bundestag 2 Wahlperiode 1953, 101 at 147 (Germany 1957).
Also Assembl~e Nationale, Documents Parlementaires No. 0002, AvantRapport Fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Etrangares sur le Projet
de Loi (No. 4676) .. ., Par July 7 (France 1957).
See however Efron & Nanes, The Common Market and Euratom Treaties: Supranationality and the Integration of Europe, 6 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
670, 676-7 (1957) who failed to notice this important difference.
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Compared with the Coal and Steel Community, the principles upon
which these new Communities are based are also different as are
their powers whose supranational feature is curbed."' The independent legal system of the European Economic Community is,
81. It is of course not possible to present here any detailed differences

between the European Coal and Steel Community on one hand, and the
European Economic Community and Euratom on tile other. Particularly the
distribution of powers among the various organs and their exercise are, in
comparison with the Coal and Steel Community, substantially modified. In
general, it may be stated that under the EEC and Euratom Treaties the
Council of Ministers wields far greater powers. Correspondingly the Commissions of these new Communities do not reach the elevated and powerful
position of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community. Thus the
French Documents Parlementaires No. 0002, Avant-Rapport op. cit. supra
note 80, at 10 pertinently observes that "le r6le des Commissions est essentiellement technique, elles ne peuvent prendre de dcisions d'ordre politique." See
further id. 12-13.
Similarly speaks the Luxembourg Expos6 des Motifs, op. cit. supra
note 80, 37-38 declaring:
. .. l'appr~ciation de 'ensemble des dispositions g~nrales et spcifiques
des Trait~s permet de dire que... l'organe directeur des nouvelles Communaut~s sera le Conseil de Ministres.... Il appartiendra en effet au
Conseil de diterminer la politique des Communaut~s et de prendre les
mesures d~cisives pour la mise en oeuvre des Trait~s. C'est principalement
par ce trait que la structure institutionnelle des nouvelles Communaut~s
se distingue de la structure donn~e 6 la Communaut6 du Charbon et de
l'Acier, caracteris~e par la concentration de r'initiative et du pouvoir
d'action aux mains d'une autorit6 supranationale. Dans les presents
Traitcs, c'est au contraire l'organe repr~sentaif des Etats membres ...
qui exerce les fonctions d~cisives pour le fonctionnement des deux Communaut~s . . . les Communaut~s nouvelles sont inspir~es plut6t par la

conception dune n9gociationpolitique continue, tendant A l'ajustement des
interets nationax.... (Emphasis added.)
See also Schriftlicher Bericht des 3. Sonderauschusses-Gemeinsamer
Markt/Euratom fiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu den Vertrdgen vom. 25.
iirz 1957 zur Griindung der Europiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der
Europdischen Atomgemeinschaft ... Drucksache No. 3660, Deutscher Bundestag 2 Wahlperiode 1953 at 16 (Germany 1957).
There is, for example, a striking difference between the powers of the
High Authority and the Commission of the EEC conzerning the administration
of the common market and of regulating competition. Although sanctions may
be imposed upon violating enterprises (EEC Treaty, Art. 87 (2a) the
manner in exercising this power is to be settled by an agreement between
the Commission and the Court (EEC Treaty, Art. 87(2d). Even so, the
Commission has evidently discretion in imposing sanctions as it "may authorize Member States to take the necessary measures, of which it shall determine
the conditions and particulars, to remedy the situation." (EEC Treaty, Art.
89(2). Contrast with this the independent powers of the High Authority to
impose sanctions. Treatj, Art. 47, para. 3; 50(3) ; 58(4) ; 64; 65(5) ; 66(6).
This shift in power towards the Council of Ministers is, for example,
well illustrated by the extended jurisdiction of the Court over the acts of the
Council. Under the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, Art. 38,
the acts of the Council may be appealed only on grounds of lack of legal
competence or major procedural violation (while the acts of the High
Authority may in addition be appealed on ground cf violation of the Treaty
or of any rule relating to its application, and misapplication of power, id.
Art. 33). Under the European Economic Community and Euratom however
the acts of the Council of Ministers are subject to appeals on all four grounds
of illegality. EEC Treaty, Art. 173, Euratom Treaty, Art. 146.
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moreover, explicitly guaranteed.8 2 It appears, therefore, highly
doubtful to wish to deduce the intent of parties from these Treaties
and apply them to the Coal and Steel Community Treaty.
Despite some hesitancy and occasional contradiction, the jurisprudence of the Court already indicates some trend in its rule of
interpretation. Its manner appears strongly influenced by the
conflict of interests present in any dispute before the Court. Thus
when higher interests of the Community clash with interests of individual enterprises an effective interpretation is frequently the rule.
Interpreting its power to review and evaluate economic findings
underlying the acts of the High Authority, the Court indirectly
follows an effective interpretation in order to keep the necessary
judicial interference with the Authority's administration at a
minimum. To check the considerable powers of the Authority, the
Court interprets most extensively the judicial protection of enterprises as provided for by the Treaty. On the other hand, the Court
has so far restrictively interpreted the Treaty provisions implying
a possible conflict between the Community and a Member State.
C. Teleological Interpretation
The teleological interpretation presupposes, first of all, the
determination of the Treaty objectives. Although these fundamental
objectives set forth by the Treaty8s are a broad policy declaration,
they are concrete enough to offer a general guidance for the interpretation of the Treaty."- Even so, in some instances the interpretation of the Court will depend on its views as to the specific content
of these objectives. In this effort the Court may be aided by definition
of objectives the High Authority is obliged to prepare regularly.85
On several occasions the Court explicitly stated that concrete aims
of the individual Treaty provisions must always be interpreted in
the light of the fundamental Treaty objectives.8 6 Thus the Court
82. EEC Treaty, Art. 232(1):
The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect those of the Treaty estab-

lishing the European Coal and Steel Community, in particular in regard
to the rights and obligations of Member States, the powers of the insti-

tutions of the said Community and the rules laid down by the said Treaty
for the functioning of the common market for coal and steel.

83. Treaty, Arts. 2-5. de Visscher, le Droit Public de la Communaut6
Europ6enne du Charbon et de l'Acier 36-7 (1956).
84. For criticism of the teleological interpretation see Stone, supra note

57, at 352-3.
85. Treaty, Art. 46, para. 3.
86. Judgement No. 1-54 (Gouvernement de la R6publique Frangaise c.

Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 8, at 23, 30 (1954-5); Judgement No. 2-54

(Gouvernement de la R~publique Italienne c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 73,
90-91 (1954-5) ; Judgement No. 8-55 (F~dration Charbonni~re de Belgique c.
Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 199, 305 (1955-6).

See also the conclusions of Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 1-54,
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has unequivocally accepted the principle of effectiveness of the
Treaty as the basic principle of interpretation.
The relation of concrete aims of the Treaty to its fundamental
objectives poses a delicate problem with regard to' the powers of
the High Authority whose exercise is specified and related to individual Treaty provisions. May the Authority use these powers in
order to pursue one of the fundamental objectives not explicitly
mentioned in a specific Treaty provision? Is the exercise of power
of the High Authority limited exclusively to the pursuance of specific
aims? The Dutch Government, in one of the earlier cases, contended
that the Authority was so limited. 7 Such an interpretation would
have, however, rigidly "departmentalized" the powers of the High
Authority and deprived it of a flexibility necessary for an efficient
administration. Guided by the requirement of effectiveness, the
Court refused to follow this narrow Dutch argument declaring that:
[T]he action of the High Authority cannot be criticized on the
ground of the Treaty, when the High Authority uses the powers
it has under Article 61 of the Treaty to act against certain consequences which are attached to the maintenance of agreement
and concentrations, consequences regarding the level of the
prices on the common market and also the fulfillment of the
objectives described in Article 3.8

The most pronounced adherence to the principle of effective interpretation may be found in the Court's judgment in the case of
FidirationCharbonnirede Belgique (Fedechar). In this case one
of the basic questions was whether the lack of explicit powers of the
High Authority to approximate prices of Belgian coal to coal prices
prevailing on the Community market, an aim set forth by Article
26 of the Transitory Protocol, could paralyze the Authority in pursuing this end. The High Authority argued that as a consequence of
its responsibility for the pursuance of the Treaty objectives, it must
have and exercise powers necessary for their attainment.8 9 Following this argument, the Court most emphatically endorsed the principle of effective interpretation. It concluded that it was permissible
to use as a:
[R]ule of interpretation generally recognized by international
law as well as by municipal laws, according to which the provi1 Recuei 35 at 53, 55-56, 59 (1954-5), in Affaire No. 8-55, 2 Recueil 231, 269
(1955-6) ; and of the Court advocate Roemer in Affaire No. 6-54 (Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 229, 233
(1955-6).
87. Affaire No. 6-54, Proc~s verbal 10.
88. Judgement No. 6-54, 4 Official Gazette 119, 129-30 (1955); foi
the official text see 1 Recueil 201, 222 (1954-5).
89. Judgement No. 8-55, 2 Recueil 192, at 214 (1955-6)
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sions of an international treaty or of a municipal law always
imply provisions without which the former provisions would
have no sense or could not be reasonably and effectively applied.
. . . Consequently to be able to discharge its responsibilities in

this instance, the High Authority must have the power to fix
prices.90
This admirable interpretation was dictated by sheer vital need of
upholding the position of the High Authority in relation to Belgian
coal mines which, in view of the High Authority's lack of an explicit authority, had claimed the right to fix prices for themselves.
In this clash of interests the Court had practically no other choice
than to uphold the Community interest--even at the risk of coming
dangerously close to exploiting, however tacitly, the doctrine of
implied powers.
The few interpretations of the Court of the substantive Treaty
provisions which regulate competition, were also inspired by the
principle of effective interpretation. Following such a rule the
Court, for good reasons, may not wish to engage in a too extensive
interpretation which might not be in accord with existing conditions.
This reserved and prudent stand may be well understood if the farreaching effects of a very extensive interpretation of discrimination,
restraint of competition or of deconcentration are fully realized. 9
Thus interpreting the Treaty in the light of its objectives, the Court
may never lose sight and understanding of the conditions which
determine the extent to which the Court may safely go in its effective
interpretation.
The basic rule of conduct binding upon the enterprises and
Member States alike is to be found in Article 4 of the Treaty. Very
briefly and generally, this Article prohibits discriminatory measures and practices among producers, buyers, and consumers and
their restrictive practices which might tend to divide or exploit the
market. By their very nature these provisions seem to be addressed
primarily to the enterprises. The States, on the other hand, must not
impose import or export duties, quantitative restrictions or special
charges in whatever form; or grant subsidies or state assistance to
the coal and steel enterprises. These provisions are considered so
essential for the operation of the common, competitive market that
the Court declared them absolutely and directly applicable throughout the Community without further implementing acts of the High
90. Id. at 305. Author's translation.
91. See the interesting observation of Court advocate Lagrange in his
conclusions in Affaire No. 1-54 (Gouvernement de la R~publique Francaise c.
Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 33, 71 (1954-5).
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Authority.12 Particularly the provisions concerning discriminatory
practices were found so vital the Court did not hesitate to view them
most broadly. 3 It is significant that the Court considered as illegal
measures discriminating not only against other coal enterprises but
even against first hand dealers who, 94 as a rule, do not enjoy an
independent protection of their own before the Court.95 The High
Authority claimed that it "...
appear[ed] necessary to protect
dealers against discrimination because they distribute approximately
one-half of the coal sales . ."9 implying that such a protection is
required if free competition is not to be endangered or impaired.
Recognizing this key role of the coal dealers the Court protected them
against discrimination 97 -an effective interpretation dictated by the
desire to uphold free competition.
So far the Court has rather skillfully avoided a comprehensive
definition of discrimination or competition. Instead, the Court
cryptically referred to some of their elements. Thus, for example,
following the Authority's argnment, 9 8 the Court found that a mere
possibility of discrimination implied in an agreement of enterprises
constituted already a discrimination. Similarly, the mere existence
of an agreement which might restrain or distort competition among
producers and/or distributors violated, in Court's view, the pro92. Judgement Nos. 7-54 and 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sidrurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 53, 91 (1955-6) ; see
also the conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer in the same Affaire. id.
107, at 135.
93. Judgement No. 1-54 (Gouvernement de la R~publique Frangaise c.
Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 7, 31 (1954-5); also Judgement No. 8-56
(Acciaierie Laminatoi Magliano Alpi (ALMA) c. Haute AutoritO). 7
Journal Officiel 5, 9 (Jan. 13, 1958).
94. Judgement No. 2-56 (Geitling c. Haute Autorit) 6 Amtsblatt 166,
181 (1957). This policy is further evinced by the Court's grant of suspension
of execution of an Authority's act to a first hand dealer who might lose his
dealership because he did not meet the qualification of a dealer as set forth
by the Ruhr sales agencies as approved by the aforementioned act of the
Authority, Ordonnance in Affaire No. 18-57 R (Nold c. Haute Autorit6) 6
(mim.) (1957).
95. Treaty, Art. 80.
96. Judgement No. 2-56 (Geitling c. Haute Autorit6) 6 Amtsblatt 166,
175 (1957).
97. Id. at 181.
98. Id. at 171. "Die Hohe Beh~rde habe demenstprechend... festgestellt,
dass die nicht genehmigte Klausel . . . eine Diskriminierung erm6glichen
wiirde ... Eine einzige solche Diskriminierung geniige zum Verbot .....
(Emphasis added.)
99. Id. at 181.
On the other hand, the Court remained silent on the argument advanced
by the High Authority according to which the objective effect upon the
Community market, and not the subjective intent of parties, is the constitutive
element of discrimination, id. at 176.
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hibitions of Article 65 of the Treaty. 100 To declare such an agreement illegal, the Court did not require evidence of actually restraining or distorting effects on competition.' 0 ' Reviewing such
possible effects of an agreement, the Court arrived at an uncompromising conclusion that:
Any limitation of the group of the first hand dealers restraints
or distorts competition; the number of persons concerned is
irrelevant. To establish this finding, it is not necessary to appreciate the concrete effects of such a regulation in each instance.
This finding is directly derived from the abstract situation as set
forth by Article 65 (1) .102
It would be unwise and premature, however, to rely, without reservation, on these extensive interpretations. It is by no means certain
that the Court will, in the future, interpret discrimination so extensively as it did in the Geitling case where the possible discrimination
and restraint of competition had been so self-evident. Situations
might arise in which possible discrimination or restraint of competition might not be so obvious, so that the Court might very well
require some evidence of their possible, if not actual, effects.
In many instances, the exercise of powers by the High Authority
depends on its appreciation and evaluation of existing economic
conditions. 10 3 As a rule, the Court may not review these findings and
evaluation of economic facts which formed the basis of the appealed
act of the High Authority. 10 4 "The Court cannot examine the evalu100. Id. at 179. ".. . sie [die Vereinbarung] teilt die Abnehmer und den

Markt auf und ist geeignet den Wettbewerb zwischen den zusammengeschlos-

senen Unternehmen einzuschrinken oder zu verfiilschen." (Emphasis added.)
101. Ibid. The Court observed that "Die Feststellung, dass die streitige
Klausel den Wettbewerb verffilscht und einschrankt, ergibt sich aus der rein
rechtlichen Wiirdigung der Handelsregelung, ohne dass dafiir elne Feststellung
und Wiirdigung wirtschaftlicher Tatsachen erforderlich wdre." (Emphasis
added.)
102. Id. at 179; author's translation.
103. Thus, for example, Treaty, Arts. 58, 60(2b), para. 5; 61, 65, 66, 67.
104. According to Treaty, Art. 33, para. 1, the Court may review, in an
annulment procedure, the facts and findings of the High Authority only if a
misapplication of power or patent misinterpretation of the Treaty are alleged.
On the other hand, when the Court has full jurisdiction ('pleine juridiction'), as for example Treaty, Art. 66(5), para. 2, such a jurisdiction always
implies a review of economic facts, irrespective of the grounds of illegality
charged. Compared with the review in case of an annulment procedure, the
extent of the Court's review in this instance is broader and represents a rule
rather than an exception. This is also the practice of the French Conseil
d'Etat, Duez & Debeyre, Trait6 de Droit Administratif 416-7 (1952).
This difference as to the extent of the Court's review, depending on the
nature of the appeal was forcefully stated by the Court advocate Roemer in
Affaire 1-56 (Bourgaux c. Assembl6e Commune) 2 Sammlung 465, 471
(1955-6) :
Der 'recours en annulation' richtet sich gegen einen beh~rdlichen Akt,
der auf seine objektive Rechtsm~ssigkeit gepriift und gegebenenfalls

COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY

ation of the situation, based on economic facts and circumstances
which led to the Decision, unless the High Authority is alleged to
have committed a 'd~tournement de pouvoir: or to have obviously
ignored the provisions of the Treaty. A study of the market situation
which would include an evaluation of structural and conjunctural
elements, would inevitably lead to such an examination."'01 5 Such an
unlimited review would practically place the administration in the
hands of the Court. 10 6 The Court would become thus a judge of
opportunity rather than of legality. For this the Court is neither
well equipped nor competent according to the Treaty. Its unlimited
review of economic findings and evaluation would interfere with and
even jeopardize an effective administration of the common market
by the High Authority. For these reasons, the Court rightly interprets restrictively misapplication of power or patent misinterpretation of Treaty to limit the need for such an extensive review. It is
an interpretation in favour of a reasonably free and more competent
administration by the High Authority.
On several occasions the Court stated a simultaneous pursuance
of specific aims together with other objectives, not specifically set
forth by the Treaty provision, did not constitute a misapplication of
power, provided this objective is one of the fundamental Treaty
objectives.1 0 7 "Even if among the motives which do justify the action
aufgehoben wird. Der 'recours de pleine juridiction' richtet sich gegen die
Behdrde als Partei und macht subjektive Rechte geltend; das Gericht
priift die Sadhe in vollen Unmfange in tatsiichlicher und rechtlicher
Hinsicht und kann die Entscheidung der Beh~rde nicht nur aufheben,
sonder auch ab~ndern oder die Beh6rde zu einer Leistung verurteilen.
See also his conclusions in Affaire No. 1:55 (Kergall c. Assembl&e Commune)
2 id. at 31, 38.
This is also the opinion of writers; see, for example, Kern, Das Recht
der Unternehmenszusammenschliisse in der Montan'anion 176 (1955) ; Munch,
Die Gerichtsbarkeit im Schunutn-Plan in Gegenwartsprobleme des Internationalen Rechts und der Rechtsphilosophie: Festschrift f/ir Rudolf Laun (Constantopoulos & Wehberg eds.) 123, at 136-7 (1953) ; Matthies, Zur Nachpriifungsbefugnis des Gerichtshofs der Montanunion, 16 Zeitschrift ffir
Auslfindisches Lffentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht 427, at 443 (Germany
1956).
105. Judgement No. 6-54 (The Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands v. High Authority) 5 Official Gazette 119, 131 (1955). For the
official text see 1 Recueil 201, 224 (1954-5) together with a correction in 4
Journal Officiel 666, at 675 (1955).
This limitation of the Court's review applies though only to the annulment procedure as shown above.
106. Rfpublique Fran~aise, Ministire des Affaires Etrangres, Rapport
de la D616gation Franvaise sur le Trait6 Instituant la Communaut6 Europ~enne du Charbon et de l'Acier 35-6 (1951).
See also the conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer in Affaire No.
6-54 (Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil
229,248 (1954-5).
107. See Judgement No. 1-54 (Gouvernement de la R~publique Frangaise
c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 7, 33 (1954-5) ; Judgement No. 2-54 (Gouverne-
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of the High Authority there had been an unjustified one . .. the
Decisions would not, because of that, be vitiated by 'dtournement
de pouvoir' inasmuch as they do not infringe upon the essential
objectives...." 108 Similarly, for the same reason, the Court interprets restrictively a patent misinterpretation of Treaty. °9 As patent
misinterpretation is not a ground of illegality by itself,110 the
appellant must first succeed in showing that the act appealed is
vitiated by one of the grounds of illegality which also implies a
patent misinterpretation. This requirement by itself limits already
the possibilities of a successful charge of a patent misinterpretation.
According to Article 33 of the Treaty a patent misinterpretation
may be committed with regard to "the provisions of the Treaty or of
a rule of law relating to its application." Interpreting this provision
restrictively, the High Authority advanced the argument that an
obvious misinterpretation of economic facts did not constitute a
patent misinterpretation of Treaty provisions within the meaning of
Article 33 of the Treaty, and that, therefore, a review of economic
facts by the Court was inadmissible. "It would be irrelevant if the
High Authority had erroneously evaluated an economic situation in
material respect as long as this error did not imply a patent misinterpretation of a legal norm.""' Without taking a direct stand, it
seems that the Court implicitly accepted this argument for it refused to review the findings of economic facts. 1 2 Moreover, the
Court does not consider every misinterpretation as being an obvious
one:
[T]he word 'obvious' supposes that the provisions of the Treaty
have been ignored to such an extent, that this ignoring seems to
follow from an evaluation of the economic situation which led
to the Decision and which evaluation is obviously wrong when
seen in the light of the provisions of the Treaty." 3
ment de la R6publique Italienne) id. 73, 103; Judgement No. 8-55 (F~d&ation Charbonni~re de Belgique c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 291, 306-7
(1955-6).
See also the conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer in Affaire 6-54
(Gouvernement du Royaunme des Pays-Bas c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 229,
at 258-9 (1955-6).
108. Judgement No. 1-54, 4 Official Gazette 8, 22 (1955) ; for the original
text of the Judgement see supra note 107.
109. Judgement No. 6-54 (Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas c.
Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 203, 225 (1954-5) ; conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer in the same Affaire id. 229, 246.
110. Thus explicitly so the Court advocate Roemer in his conclusions
in Affaire No. 6-54 op. cit. supra note 109, at 238. It is strildng, however,
that the Court avoided to take a stand on this issue, see id. 224.
111. Judgement No. 2-56 (Geitling c. Haute Autorit6), 6 Aintsblatt 166,
at 172 (1957) ; author's translation.
112. Id. at 179.
113. Judgement No. 6-54, 4 Official Gazette 119, 131 (1955) ; the original version may be found in 1 Recueil 203, 225 (1954-5).
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It is natural that a mere charge of a patent misinterpretation will
not move the Court to review economic facts.114 Although not demanding full evidence, the Court requires weighty indications of
such a misinterpretation before it feels justified to take up such a
review." 5
D. Extensive Interpretation:Protectionof Enterprises
With great consistency does the Court interpret extensively the
protection of enterprises, as for example, the Treaty provisions concerning appeals against allegedly illegal acts of the High Authority"16
or its formal requirements prescribed for the preparation of its
acts. 11 7 Such an extensive interpretation is justified by the very
nature of the Treaty as a public law of the Community. In its interpretation the Court follows the practice of national courts which
usually protect individuals against acts of public authorities extensively and liberally. Moreover, the Court seeks thus to counterbalance the powers of the High Authority and mitigate the inherent
inequality between the Authority and the enterprises. Providing for
an easy appeal, the Court has a frequent opportunity to control the
legality of the Authority's administration. This wise consideration
may foster a grdwing confidence in the judiciary, speed-up the
development of the case law and help to create a greater sense of
legal security.
An extensive interpretation of protection is already indicated
by the Rules of Procedure established by the Court. It should be
mentioned that in some instances these Rules grant a more extensive protection than the Treaty itself. Thus, for example, the Court
in its Rules extended the period for lodging appeals for annulment
originally determined by Article 33 of the Treaty. 1 8 Or, to cite another example, the Rules established a right of the appellant to
demand in an annulment procedure that the Court renders a judgement by default against the Authority which failed to appear before the Court"-a right which the Statute of the Court, prepared
by the Member States themselves, reserved only to cases in which
the Court has full jurisdiction.

2 0

It is, however, the jurisprudence of the Court which reveals
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Judgement No. 6-54, 1 Recueil 203, 225 (1954-5).
Judgement No. 6-54, id. at 225.
Treaty, Art. 33, para. 2.
Id. Art. 15.
Rules, Art. 85.
Rules, Art. 72.
Code, Art. 35.
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the extensive interpretation of the protection of enterprises and their
associations. Article 33 of the Treaty provides:
The enterprises, or the associations referred to in Article 48,
shall have the right of appeal on the same grounds against individual decisions and recommendations affecting them, or against
they deem to
general decisions and recommendations which 121
involve a misapplication of power affecting them.
This provision must be read in conjunction with Article 80 of the
Treaty, according to which "[T]he term enterprise... refers to any
enterprise engaged in the production in the field of coal and
steel.... ." An attempt was made to distinguish between coal and
steel enterprises in the sense that only coal enterprises affected by
an Authority's act dealing with some problems of the coal industry
could appeal to the Court and vise versa.322 Thus steel enterprises,
even though affected by such an act, would have had no right to
appeal at all. The Court refused to restrict the appeal of enterprises
by the nature of the subject involved in the dispute. Interpreting
this provision extensively, it declared that ". . . no provision of the
Treaty requires that specialization of producers be related to the
nature of the dispute. The silence of the Treaty could not be
interpreted to the detriment of the enterprises and the associations.'.

2

3

What really matters in the Court's extensive interpretation

is only that the production activity is carried out in one of the
fields of heavy industry as defined by the Treaty.
The conditions under which enterprises and their associations
may appeal allegedly illegal acts of the High Authority 24 offer one
121. Treaty, Art 33, para. 1, states:
The Court shall have jurisdiction over appeals by a member State or by
the Council for the annulment of decisions and recommendations of the
High Authority on the grounds of lack of legal competence, major violation of procedure, violation of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating
to its application, or abuse of power. However, the Court may not review the High Authority's evaluation of the situation, based on economic
facts and circumstances which led to such decisions or recommendations,
except where the High Authority is alleged to have abused its powers or
to have dearly misinterpreted the provisions of the Treaty or of a rule
of law relating to its application.
The French expression ditournement de pouvoir as used in Art. 33 is
incorrectly translated in English as abuse of power-an error which is also
perpetrated in the EEC and Euratom Treaties, Arts. 173, para. 1, 145,
para. I respectively.
Throughout the article preference is given to the expression misapplication of power as the English counterpart to ditourneinent de pouvoir.
122. Judgement Nos. 7-54 and 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sid~urgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 55, 85-6 (1955-6).
123. Id. at 86; author's translation. See also the conclusions of the
Court advocate Roemer, id. 107, at 114.
124. For a detailed discussion of this problem see Bebr, Protection of
PrivateInterests Under the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 Va. L.
Rev. 879, especially at 883-910 (1956).
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of the most persuasive instances of a very extensive interpretation
by the Court. The Treaty itself is somewhat vague on this point.
It left, however, no doubt that for such an appeal a violation of
right of an enterprise is not required. The Court has boldly used
the flexible concept of "interests affected" as the cornerstone of the
enterprises' protection. 125 A skilful manipulation of this concept in
the hands of the French Conseil d'Etat has resulted in a very
efficient and admirably flexible protection, void of any doctrinal
sterility. The Court seems to follow this policy. It views "interests
affected" very liberally, being evidently determined to preclude only
an actio popularis and spare thus the High Authority from harrassement by unfounded appeals. It is significant that up to now the
Court has never dismissed an appeal for annulment for lack of
"interests affected."
The extent of the right of appeal of enterprises and their
associations depends on whether their interests were affected by
a general or individual act of the High Authority. 26 This distinction
as to the character of the act is irrelevant for the States which may
appeal general or individual acts on the same grounds of illegality.1 27
It is, however, of vital importance for the enterprises and their
associations. While they may appeal individual acts on any of the
four grounds of illegality, their appeal against general acts is limited
to misapplication of power only.1 28 Despite the far-reaching consequences of this distinction, the Treaty strangely enough does not
indicate the difference between these two categories of acts. A
restrictive interpretation of the individual character of acts would
have precariously impaired the enterprises' protection. To assure
them and their associations of the broadest possible protection without endangering though the effective operation of the Community,
the Court has extensively interpreted the indVidual character of an
act at the expense of general acts. By this interpretation the Court
has enabled the enterprises to protect their interests by appeals based
125. In most instances this is implicit in the Court's accepting the
jurisdiction; only occasionally does the Court ex-plicitly state so, as for
example, in its recent Ordonnance 18-57 R (Nold c. Haute Autorit6) 5
(mim.) (1957). The conclusions of the Court advocates however discuss this
question fully; see for example the conclusions of the Court advocate Lagrange
in Affaire No. 3-54 (Assider c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 143, 174 (1954-5),
in Affaire No. 8-55 (F6dration Charbonni~re c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil
231, 246-7 (1955-6) ; and of the Court advocate Roemer in Affaire Nos. 7-54
et 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sidrurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute
Autorit6) 2 Recueil 107, 123-5 (1955-6).
See also Bebr, supra note 124, at 888-890.
126. For further discussion of this question see Bebr, id. 911-8.
127. Treaty, Art. 33, para. 1.
128. Id. Art. 33, para. 2.
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on all four grounds of illegality. In its interpretation the Court has
firmly refused to permit any formalistic considerations to interfere
with an effective protection. ".

.

. The character of a decision does

not depend on its form but on its content"'129 declared the Court.
Thus the Court declined to accept the form of publication of an act
as being indicative of its character. The effects of an act and its
content evidently count more in the view of the Court than its form
or the person of the addressee. 30 "It is sufficient for the right to
appeal of an enterprise or association against a decision or recommendation," observed the Court, "that this decision or recommendation is not general, but that it has an individual character, without
showing this character in relation to the appellant.''3 In an equally
extensive manner the Court has interpreted the meaning of an act
itself. Thus the Court did not hesitate, for example, to consider a
letter of the High Authority addressed to the Belgium Government
and officially published,'2 2 or a private communication to an enterprise, 133 as an individual act subject to appeal.
Equally extensively are interpreted the formal requirement of
the High Authority of the preparation and motivation of its acts.
Such an interpretation helps to assure a legal administration and
extends additional, indirect protection to the enterprises. In several
instances the Authority must, before taking action, consult with
the Consultative Committee, an expert body,184 or with the Council
of Ministers. 3 5 Although obliged to consult these bodies the Authority is free to disregard their opinions. Nonetheless because of the
weighty importance of these opinions which may well prompt the
Authority to modify, if not abandon, the proposed act, the Court
129. Judgement No. 8-55 (F6dration Charbonni~re de Belgique c.
Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 201, 226 (1955-6) ; also the conclusions of the
Court advocate Roemer in Affaire Nos. 7-54 et 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sid6rurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorit6) id. 107, at 121-2.
130. Conclusions of the Court advocate Roemer, id. at 122.
131. Judgement Nos. 7-54 et 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sid~rurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 55, 87 (1955-6),
author's translation.
132. Judgement No. 8-55 (F~d~ration Charbonniire de Belgique c.
Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 201, 224; also the conclusions of the Court advocate Lagrange id. 231, at 244-5.
133. Judgements Nos. 1-57 et 14-57 (La Soci6t6 des Usines a Tubes de
la Sarre c. Haute Autorit), 7 Journal Officiel 11, 17-8 (Jan. 13, 1958).
134. Treaty, Arts. 19, para. 1, 53, 55(2), 56, 58(1,3), 59(1,5,6),
60(1,2); 61, para. 1, 62, 68(2); 95, para. 1.
135. Ibid. For example Arts. 37, para. 2, 50(2), 51(1), para. 3, 53(a),
59(6), 60(1), 61, para. 1, 66(1-4), 67(2,3), 68(5), 73, para. 2.
This prescribed consultation must not however be confused with the
concurring vote of the Council of Ministers required for some acts of the
High Authority, as for example, Arts. 50(2), 58(1), 59(5), 74(2,3), 56,
para. 2(b), 66(3). For further discussion of this question see Bebr, The
European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal Iniovation 63
Yale L.J. 1, 22-4 (1953).
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interprets this obligation extensively. "These rules of procedure are
intended to guarantee that the decisions are taken with the necessary
circumspection, so that these rules have to le considered as major
rules and consequently the Court will have to investigate if these
rules have been observed."' 86 The High Authority must motivate its
acts ;137 the extent of such a motivation is left: undefined. The Court
found the High Authority obliged to mention in the preamble of its
decisions ".

.

. the essential elements of the factual establishments

which legally justify the measure in question."' 8 8 In the Geitling
case the Court forcefully stated that "the reason should contain considerations upon which the decision is based in order to permit a
judicial review." 8 9 Striking down an act for its lack of motives, the
Court declared in a recent decision that "-

.

. motivation of an

opinion is not only prescribed by Articles 5, 15 and 54 of the
Treaty, but it constitutes an element essential, nay constitutive, of
such an act. The lack of motives is such that it makes the act nonexistent."' 40
According to national administrative law which are as a rule
governed by the inquisitorial principle, municipal courts may conduct ex officio examinations. The Court, in several instances, also
examined ex officio matters which went beyond the charges brought.
As already indicated by its Code and Rules of Procedure, the Court
has inquisitorial powers 4L' which justify an ex officio examination.
Fairly uniformly the Court has ex officio examined the receivability
of appeal 42 or intervention148 in all their essential elements. However, the Court seems to waver in its willingness to proceed beyond
the charges of appeal and examine additional illegalities. In most
instances the Court had to deal with grounds of illegality, particularly with a possible non-observance of major procedural require136. Judgement No. 6-54 (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. High Authority) 4 Official Gazette 119, 128 (1955). The official text of the judgment may
be found in 1 Recueil 203, 220 (1954-5).
137. Treaty, Art. 15, para. 1.
138. Judgement 6-54 (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. High Authority)
4 Official Gazette 119, 128 (1955).
139. Judgement No. 2-56 (Geitling v. Haute Autorit6) 6 Amtsblatt 166,
177 (1957) ; author's translation.
140. Judgement Nos. 1-57 et 14-57 (La Soci~t6 des Usines i Tubes de
la Sarre c. Haute Autorit6) 7 journal Officiel 11, 18 (Jan. 13, 1958) ; author's
translation.
141. Code, Arts. 24, 25, 28, para. 3; Rules, Chapter II, Sections 1, 2.
142. See for example Judgement No. 6-54 (Gouvernement du Royaume
des Pays-Bas c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 203, 219 (1954-5); No. 2-56
(Geitling c. Haute Autorit6) 6 Amtsblatt 166, 176 (1957); No. 1-54
(Gouvernement de la R~publique Franaise c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 9,
19 (1954-55).
143. Judgement Nos. 7-54 et 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sidurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 55, 86 (1955-56).
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ments. Thus, for example, in one instance, the Court examined the
observance of major procedural requirement, 14 4 although the appeal
charged only Treaty violation and misapplication of power. 45 The
Italian case is particularly noteworthy. During the oral proceedings
the Italian Government attempted to bring a new charge of major
procedural violation of the High Authority for its inadequate consultation with the Consultative Committee.1 40 Additional charges
alleged after the submission of the appeal are however inadmissible
according to the Statute of the Court which requires that all charges
be brought already in the appeal. 1 47 Unlike the opinion of the Court
advocate who dismissed the charge on this ground,14 8 the Court
concluded that ".... this ground has to be examined ex officio, because if it were well-founded an annulment ex officio for violation
of the Treaty and major violation of procedure would be justified."" 49
This, however, did not prevent the Court from refusing in the
same case to examine additional charges of major procedural violation of the High Authority for insufficiently motivating its act.18 0
This ambivalent stand is even more vividly shown in one of the later
cases in which the Court refused to admit ". . . charges which were
presented for the first time in the reply, without even being mentioned in the appeal."''15 It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile
these contradictory stands of the Court in situations which in their
substance and nature were pretty much alike. When faced with a
144. Judgement No. 1-54 (Gouvernement de Ia R~publique Franaise c.

Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 9, 31 (1954-55).
145. Id. at 15.

146. Judgement No. 2-54 (Gouvernement de la R6publique Italienne c.
Haute Autorit6) 1 Recueil 75, 99 (1954-55).
147. Code, Art. 22, para. 1.
148. Conclusions of the Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire 2-54, 1

Recueil 107, 116 (1954-55):

...
il s'agirait alors lL d'un inoyen nouveau qui n! a pas 6t6 invoqu6 en
temps utile. Les dispositions de l'article 22 du Protocole sur la Statut de
la Cour de Justice sont formelles i cet 6gard: la requite, qui doit ftre
d6pos~e dans le d6lai de rigueur d'un mois, conform6ment i l'article 33
du Trait6, doit contenir 1'expos6 an moins sommaire des moyens invoqus.
Par ailleurs, il ne s'agit pas, selon nous, d 'un moyen d'ordre public, tel
que l'incomptence, qui pourrait 6tre soulev6 a tout moment et m~me
relev6 d'office par le juge.
149. Judgement No. 2-54 (The Government of the Italian Republic v.

High Authority) 4 Official Gazette 23, 39 (1955). Note that the original text
of the judgement speaks significantly about 'une annulation d'office,' 1 Recueil
75, at 99 (1954-55).
150. Id. at 100. "Ce moyen, bast sur un vice de forme, n'a 6t6 soulev6 que
dans la r~plique. Pour cette raison, l'ordre public n'exigeant pas un examen
d'office, la Cour, d'accord avec l'Avocat g6neral, d6clare le moyen irrecevable,
conform6ment i l'article 29, paragraphe 3 du R~glement de la Cour."
151. Judgement No. 9-55 (Socit6 des Charbonnages de Beeringen,
Soci6t6 des Charbonnages de Houthalen, Socit6 des Charbonnages de
Helchteren et Zolder c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 323, 352 (1955-6) ; author's

translation.
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possible examination ex officio, the Court seems to rely on consideration of equity.152 Thus in most instances the Court undertook
an examination ex officio in response to a charge of illegality belatedly brought which would have been otherwise inadmissible. 5
Both the nature of the appeal and of the Court's jurisdiction may
have some bearing on the matter as may have the gravity of a
possible illegality. This and the prevailing interest in a legal administration seem to prompt the Court to examine it ex officio and set
aside the strict requirement of the Statute of the Court.
E. Restrictive Interpretation:Conflict of Ccwmmunity
and State Powers
A realistic consideration of political elements inherent in a conflict of competence between the Community and a Member State
seems to counsel the Court to interpret the Treaty restrictively and
rather in favour of the State. Such an interpretation is conditioned
by several factors. First, the powers of the Community are rather
an exception than a rule. Second, its specifically reserved powers
are so revolutionary that it cannot be assumed that the States
wished, in general, to confer more powers on the Community than
explicitly provided for by the Treaty. This reserved stand as to
the powers retained by the Member States is well illustrated by the
strong position of the Council of Ministers in the Community's
institutional structure, its powers and prescribed participation in
the administration of the common market. To substantiate this
general observation, a few selected examples are offered. As the
original proposal did not provide for a governmental body, 5 4 the
subsequent establishment of the Council attests to the importance
of the governmental powers for the operation of the Community.
This is particularly well reflected in the concurring vote of the
Council prescribed' 5 5 for the High Authority's acts on vital matters and even more so in its unanimous concurrence required for
all acts of the High Authority, which though not provided for by
the Treaty, appear necessary for the operation of the common mar152. However, under no circumstances may the Court undertake ex
officio a review of economic facts and findings as found by the High Authority; this follows clearly from the language of the provision of Art. 33, para. 1.
153. See supra notes 144, 146.
154. L'Institut des Relations Internationales de Bruxelles, op. cit. supra

note 27 at 198.
15 9. Treaty requires a majority vote of the Council in following in-

stances: Arts. 50(2), 55(2)(c), 56(1)(b), 56, para. 2, 58(1), para. 1,

58(3), 59(5), 74 para. 2, 88, para. 3, 95, para. 4, 96, para. 1. Unanimity is
prescribed in Arts. 53(b), 54, para. 2, 58(1) para. 2, 58(3), 59(1), para. 1,
59(1), para. 2, 59(2), para. 1, 59(5), 59(6), para. 2, 72, para. 1. 74, para. 2,
95, paras. 1, 2, 98.
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ket. 58 Finally, unlike the High Authority, the Council is subject to
a very limited judicial control. The Council may not be challenged
for a Treaty violation or for misapplication of power' 5 7 and it retains thus considerable freedom and independence. These examples
are not intended to minimize the High Authority's supranational
powers; they should merely show the role of the States in the Community's structure and the possible effect this may have on the interpretation of a conflict of competence between the Community and a
Member State.
The respect of the Court for State powers is well illustrated
by the Luxembourg case"' which has been so far the only one
which dealt with this problem. In a nutshell, this case raised the
question whether the charges imposed by the Luxembourg Government on all imports of solid fuel constitutes a discrimination within
the meaning of Article 4(b) (c) of the Treaty. 59 Being aware of
the delicate and explosive nature of the issue-and perhaps also
of the dangers of establishing an unpopular precedent encroaching
upon State powers-the Court treated the exercise of State powers
respectfully. First, the judgement revealed, at least implicitly, that
the extent and nature of discrimination committed by an enterprise
of Member State are not identical. "0 The whole tenor of this judgement indicates a much narrower interpretation of "governmental"
discrimination resulting, according to the Court's explanation, from
a partial integration.' 8 ' According to the Court's restrictive interpretation this is borne out by Article 67 of the Treaty which "provides only for an intervention of the High Authority with regard
to actions by a member State which have 'appreciable' reprecussions
on the conditions of competition in the coal and steel industries.... 18 2
The Court openly admitted State discrimination declaring:
156. Treaty Art. 95, para. 1. According to one commentator this provision precludes the application of the doctrine of implied powers, de Visscher,
La Communaut6 Europenne du Charbon et de l'Acier et les Etats Membres
61 (Centre Italien d'Etudes Juridiques, CongrZs International d'Etudes sur la
Communaut6 Europenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, 1957).
157. Id. art. 38.
Under the European Economic Community and Euratom the Council
of Ministers wields far greater powers than the Commissions do. For this
reason the acts of the Council may be challenged on all four grounds of
illegality as the acts of the High Authority under the Coal and Steel Community Treaty; EEC Treaty, Art. 173; Euratom Treaty, Art. 146.
158. judgement Nos. 7-54 et 9-54 (Groupement des Industries Sidirurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorit6) 2 Recueil 55 (1955-6).
159. Id. at 64-5.

160. The Treaty itself actually distinguishes between the discriminations
committed by the enterprises or by a Member State. See Arts. 60, 65, 66 and
compare with Arts. 4(c), 67(3).
161. Judgement Nos. 7-54 et 9-54, 2 Recueil 55, 97 (1955-6).
162. 5 Official Gazette 190, 213 (1956).
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It follows from Article 67 that any action by a member State
which might have an appreciable effect on the conditions of competition in the coal and steel industries falling under the jurisdiction of the Community is not necessarily abolished or prohibited
by the Treaty and therefore does not necessarily constitute a
measure or practice which establishes a discrimination prohibited by Article 4(b) ....1.1

Discussing the actual case at the bar, the Court concluded that"...
the prohibition of special charges does not affect the right of a
member State to impose upon its subjects general charges. It is
irrelevant whether the charge is imposed in the form of a tax or a
duty or in the form of a compensation which has the same economic
effect.
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III. MUNICIPAL LAW

AS PART OF THE LAW OF THE COMMUNITY:
ITS APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION

In several instances the Court applies and interprets municipal
law of the Member States to which the Treaty makes specific
reference. 6 5 Thus, for example, officials of the High Authority who
are to verify informations of the enterprises on the spot have the
same rights and duties as tax officials of the Member State concerned.18 6 An indemnity action of an enterprise against the Community for damages caused by an official abusing his rights will
prompt the Court to interpret municipal law regulating the status
of tax officials. The Court may, however, interpret municipal law
most frequently when dealing with disputes arising out of public
or private contracts to which the Community is a party, provided
such contracts contain a clause which confers jurisdiction upon the
Court.' 0 ' Thus the loan and guarantee agreements concluded by the

High Authority with individual enterprises are almost without
exception made subject to the jurisdiction ot the Court.06
The Community knows no law of contracts of its own. For this
reason the loan agreements specifically provide that municipal law
of the borrowing enterprise should govern. 69 Judging from the
principles on which the High Authority's action in the field of
financing investment is based as well as from the practice of the
163. Ibid.
164. 2 Recueil 55, 95 (1955-6), author's translation.
165. For examples see supra note 51.
166. Treaty, Art. 86, para. 4.
167. Treaty, Art. 42.
168. Blondeel & Van der Eycken, Les emprunts de la Cominr aut6
Europenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, 19 Revue de la Banque 249, 283 (Belgium, 1955).
169. Id. at 284.
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High Authority, those agreements are apparently governed by
private municipal law. This solution appears deceptively simple and
the value of this practice should not be overestimated. Although
the application of a specific municipal law is firmly settled, the
question remains whether such a contract is really a private rather
than a public law contract. It should not be overlooked that one of
the parties to the agreement is the Community the public nature of
which may hardly be questioned. Such loan agreements, it might
be argued, contain necessarily certain elements of public law. The
loans and their guarantees are granted to the enterprises for specific
purposes after being examined and approved by the High Authority
to be in accord with and in furtherance of the higher Community
objectives.1 7 0 The conclusion of such agreements might well be
71
considered as an exercise of public powers by the High Authority
-a criterion frequently used in an attempt to distinguish between
private and public law. Admitted, such a distinction is very difficult
even in municipal law as is well evinced by the unsettled and wavering jurisprudence of municipal courts. The Court faces then even
greater difficulties in solving this problem. Under these circumstances the only practical solution seems to be to proceed from case
to case and examine the type of relation and interests involved.
Applying municipal law the Court is, at least formally, not bound
to follow the jurisprudence of municipal courts. For practical and
political reasons, however, the Court will most likely do so.1 72 The
legal system of the Community forms, in a way, a part of municipal
law; it would be unwise for the Court to interpret municipal law
in a manner contrary to the jurisprudence of the highest municipal
courts. It might weaken the respect which its jurisprudence must
necessarily command.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The present discussion of the interpretation of the Treaty by
the Court of the Community cannot claim to be exhaustive. Although it discusses by far the most important aspect of the problem,
170. Treaty, Arts. 54, para. 5, 56. European Coal and Steel Community,
the High Authority, Fifth General Report on the Activities of the Community 318-323 (1957) ; Haute Autorit6, Bulletin Mensuel d'Information 46-7
(No. 9, Nov. 1956) ; also id. at 19 (No. 8, Sept.-Oct. 1956).
171. Thus the French contrats administratifs,Duez & Debeyre, op. cit.
supra note 104, 191-2.
172. The International Court of Justice follows, as a rule, the jurisprudence of municipal courts when interpreting municipal law. See Serbian
Loans, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, Nos. 20/21 at 46, 124 (1929). Further Jenks, The
Interpretation and Application of Municipal Law by the Permanent Court
of InternationalJustice, 19 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 67, 93-4 (1938).
There is even greater justification for the Court of the Community to
do so.
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out of necessity it leaves aside the interpret.tion of the Treaty provisions by municipal courts of the Member States as well as the
complex question arising out of the relation of the Community legal
system with that of the Member States. These problems deserve to
be examined in another, separate study. To avoid, however, a distorted picture which these omissions may create, the fundamentals
of these problems pertinent to the present discussion will be mentioned at least briefly.
The jurisdiction of the Court is rather an exception than a rule
and thus, unfortunately, it is not the only court which may interpret the Treaty. Although in no position to review the validity of
acts of the High Authority or of the Council, 1'73 municipal courts
may also interpret the Treaty in disputes brought before them. Frequently such disputes will involve effects caused by Authority's acts
74
within the realm of private lawY.
Interpreting the Treaty provisions municipal courts are not obliged to refer such a question to
the Court of the Community. Thus there is no guarantee of a uniform interpretation of the Treaty by municipal courts. A possibly
divergent jurisprudence may not be conducive to the uniform
growth of the Community law. First, there is an undeniable danger
that some municipal courts might lack the necessary understanding
of the unique complexities and intricacies of the Treaty-as it was
already the case.17 5 Second, no neat line may be drawn between
the jurisdiction of the Community and that of municipal courts.
Complex problems of conflict of jurisdiction are bound to occur-yet
there is no guarantee of a uniform interpretation of this knotty
problem. Finally, there are possible conflicts of the Treaty provisions
as well as of acts of the High Authority with municipal law of the
Member States. It would be idle to pretend that these problems
may be easily solved. The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom seem to clear these uncertainties
and forestall such an undesirable development inasmuch as they
commit the highest municipal courts of the Member States to refer
the interpretation of the Treaty provisions, which might be involved
76
in a dispute before such a court, to the Court of the CommunityY.
This is certainly a notable improvement which should help to secure
a uniform interpretation of the Treaty.
173. Treaty, Art. 41.
174. Conclusions of the Court advocate Lagrange in Affaire No. 1-54
(Gouvernement de ]a R~publique Francaise c. Haute Autorit6) 1 Recuell 35,

60 (1954-5). See also Krawielicki, Director of the Legal Division of the
High Authority, in an address delivered in Dusseldorf on Nov. 1, 1953 especially at 14-6 (mim.).
175. Thus the judgement of the Landesgericht Stuttgart, Aug. 10, 1953
(No. 6 Q 7/53) particularly at 15 (mira.).
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The Court plays an important part in the operation of the Community as well as in the judicial system of the Member States.
Whatever the legal force of the Court's precedents may be, they
carry a weight which the municipal courts of the Member States
may find difficult to ignore. The creative interpretation of the Treaty
by the Court is undoubtedly a potentially powerful force for the
development of a true common law of the Community. It would be
deplorable if the Court would hamper and stall this development by
an application of traditional international law which in most instances is utterly out of place. The creative interpretation is the
more important as the Community lacks true legislative powers.
For this reason the teleological interpretation of the Court is particularly vital. Admitted, there is a deep rooted aversion of courts
against legislation by interpretation. Particularly teleological interpretation may spill over the feasible limits given by the existing
economic and political realities. Within these limits, however, the
Court should seize every opportunity to promote by its jurisprudence the development of a Community law. Implicitly the Court
is entrusted with such a mission; it would be regrettable if the Court
through timidity and lack of realistic determination would fail to
perform this noble mission. With the establishment of the European
Economic Community and Euratom, the Court's jurisdiction is
notably extended and the field for its creative interpretation considerably enlarged. Even though these Communities are legally
independent organizations, partly based on different principles, and
the jurisdiction of the Court differs in each case, it may be safely
assumed that the jurisprudence of the Court rendered for the various
Communities will mutually influence each other. And in the long
run a gradual rapprochement of the various jurisprudences and
ultimate fusion is bound to come.
Most important is the Court's administrative jurisdiction.
Though the Court may merely annul the acts of the High Authority,
this negative intervention may be powerful enough to exert some
pressure on the Authority and influence its economic policy. The
Court represents thus not only a creative legal force but a political
power of no mean proportions as well. Its stature and power is,
moreover, further enhanced by the European Economic Community
and Euratom. Under these circumstances, the Court may well become a rallying point for the European idea for whose promotion
the Court may wisely and boldly employ its entrusted political and
legal powers.
176. EEC Treaty, Art. 177, para. 3; Euratom Treaty, Art. 150, para. 3.

